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Abstract
We estimate order of market entry effects when moderated by the strategic characteristics
of the entering firm. Although the main effect of order of market entry on market share is
remarkably strong, we find, when we control for firms' strategic inclinations, that certain
strategic types appear to fare better than others when pioneering new financial services.
Such differences could help explain situations in which later entrants outperform pioneers.
We thank Professors donald Lessard and Scott Stem for their many thoughtful comments
and suggestions.





This essay examines the relationship between order of market entry, competitive
strategy. and performance in financial services. We attempt to answer one question: Are
there variations in the relationship between order of market entry and long term market
share and performance for financial service firms that exhibit different strategic
behaviors? To do so, we first review extant literature on the subject. Thereupon, we
formulate hypotheses and propose a model. The model is empirically tested and followed
by a summary of results and a discussion. Our results reveal that the effects of early entry
are stronger for strategic types which are typical early entrants.
Introduction and Research Background
As reviewed in Lopez and Roberts (1997), first-movers have been shown to enjoy
important long-term market share advantages. A negative relationship between order of
market entry and market share has been found to be consistent across many and different
product lines.
Aside from this relationship, two other generalizations are fairly well established
(Kalyanaram et al., 1993). First, "...in the case of consumer packaged goods and
prescription anti-ulcer drugs, the entrant's market share divided by the first entrant's share
roughly equals one divided by the square root of order of market entry" (Kalyanaram et
al., 1993:1). Second, "...the advantage of pioneers in mature markets slowly declines
over time" (Kalyanaram et al., 1993:1).
In services Tufano (1989) found, for a sample of 58 financial innovations, that
pioneering investment banks did gain larger market shares than later entrants. Tufano
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(1989) showed that pioneers capture shares which are "...almost 2.5 times as large as the
followers in those markets" (Tufano, 1989: 231). Such advantage seems to remain
consistent in subsequent years of the life of the product. The same firm is shown to
capture substantially less share with imitations than with innovations. Another empirical
study by Lopez and Roberts (1997) also suggests that pioneers of financial services
innovations tend to capture larger market shares than later entrants. However, whether
such proclivity to innovate is associated with particular strategies is not directly tested in
these studies. Despite the remarkable consistency of the relationship between order of
entry and market share, the question remains whether certain strategies are associated
with better performance for a given timing of entry decision. Schnaars (1994) argues that
later entrants can seize markets from pioneers through the management of adequate
imitation strategies. Yet, other authors (for example Zahra, et al., 1995) support the
opposing notion: that pioneering, if properly managed, can provide competitive
advantage. In general, there is evidence that indicates that some firms might be good at
pioneering while others probably perform better as imitators. Given that imitating a
financial product is considerably less expensive than creating it,' it is plausible that some
firms find it more profitable to become perennial imitators. Hence it becomes important
to examine not only entry per se, but the alignment of firms' strategic intentions in regard
to entries into new markets. Both variables in conjunction should provide us with a more
complete view of factors that mediate the well-known relationship between order of
market entry and market share.
We shall not repeat here the main findings of the literature on order of market
entry, which have been reviewed elsewhere ( Lopez and Roberts, 1997; Robinson et al.,
1994, Szymanski et al., 1995; Kerin et al., 1992), but will concentrate on the much
'Tufano (1988) indicates that imitating a financial product can cost only 25% to 50% of the cost involved in
creating it.
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smaller subset that examines concepts that might somehow be related to competitive
strategy and order of market entry.
Some studies have shown that pioneering doesn't necessarily result in larger
market shares. Golder and Tellis (1993), using an historical approach, found that not all
pioneering efforts end in success. In fact they report a 47% failure rate for pioneers.
Such results are different from the findings of other authors, and the discrepancies may be
attributed to differences in the operational definition of the pioneer. While some authors
in the marketing area define pioneers as those which first achieve national distribution
(Urban et al., 1986) or as "... the first business to develop such product or service"
(Robinson and Fomell, 1992), Golder and Tellis define the pioneer as the first to enter a
market. Golder and Tellis, however, do find that "early leaders", defined as firms which
are the market share leaders during the early growth phase of the product life cycle, are
very successful. Their findings indicate that these early leaders retain a large market
share (28% on average) and have low failure rates. These "early leaders" are not
necessarily the pioneers. Some enter the market several years after the pioneer, and
Golder and Tellis (1993) speculate that they are successful because have developed
particular traits and abilities which condition such success. In their words (Golder and
Tellis, 1993:167):
Why are early leaders so successful? The reason may be their ability to spot a
market opportunity and their willingness to commit large resources to develop the
market. Indeed, in many of the categories we studied, the start of the growth
phase in the product life cycle may well be attributed to the market-building
efforts of these early leaders. Our finding is similar to Chandler's (1990) for
industrial goods, where long-term survival and success were due more to the
commitment of adequate resources to large-scale production than to entering first.
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This indicates that firms may be conditioned by their strategies to reap different
market shares for different times of entry. Pioneering, hence, may exert an important
main effect upon market share, but interactions with other variables, particularly variables
that are associated with firms' skills, resources, and abilities to deploy such resources, is
plausible.
Several authors have advocated the need to study these interactions and to
specifically model the effect of pioneering on market share in combination with strategic
variables (Kerin et al., 1992; Moore et al., 1991; Kalyanaram and Urban, 1992) and not
only the main effect caused by pioneering. For instance, Robinson et al., (1992) explored
whether entering a market at various times was coupled to different skill and resource
profiles. They discussed "two conflicting patterns": on the one hand, if pioneering
results in market share advantages, then all firms will want to enter markets first. It will
only be those competitors with intrinsic strengths that will force themselves into the
market, thus resulting in an "absolute pioneering advantage." On the other hand, the
"comparative pioneering advantage hypothesis" would stress that "strategic windows"
open during the course of market evolution for certain strategic types. As these authors
indicate (Robinson et al., 1992:1-2), "...the market pioneer-type will realize greater
performance if both it and the later entrant-type attempt to be market pioneers. The later
entrant-type will realize greater performance if both it and the market pioneer-type
attempt to be later entrants." Their findings indicate that market pioneers, early
followers, and late entrants tend to have different skills and resource profiles, and "...the
'strategic window' for market entry tends to open at different times for different entrant
types" (Robinson et al., 1992: 622). Szymanski et al. (1995: 30) also argue, utilizing data
from several studies, that "...modeling order of entry as an interaction effect appears to
capture best the relationship between order of entry and market share." Success, hence,
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doesn't immediately follow from pioneering, and this, in turn, might be a function of the
way in which skills and resources are deployed by pioneering and follower firms. Lilien
and Yoon (1990), for instance, model entry as a strategic decision (in this case defined as
the choice between being a pioneer or a follower) influenced by the competition of other
entrants in R&D, product, market, and the like. These authors found that the likelihood
of success for first and second entrants was lower than the likelihood of success for the
third and fourth entrants in a sample of 112 new industrial products from 52 French firms.
This could suggest that later entrants can overcome pioneer advantages through a more
apt deployment of resources and skills. Along these lines, Moore et al. (1991) developed
a model in which pioneering was considered to be endogenous, (that is, they assigned the
advantage earned by first-movers to firm proficiency rather than solely to pioneering).
The authors found that the relationship between market share gains and entry times is
partially based on "...unobservable determinants of success such as management skills
and resources" (Moore et al., 1991: 103). Murthi, Srinvasan and Kalyanaram (1996)
reexamine the relationship between pioneering and market share controlling for
managerial skills. Their analysis shows that the strength of the relationship between
order of market entry and market share is not diminished or altered in any important way
when such controls are introduced. Perhaps such unobservable determinants should
encompass managerial skills and a combination of additional organizational variables.
In all, this suggests that the relationship between order of market entry and market
share should be treated in conjunction with environmental and organizational factors.
Firms have different strategic inclinations in terms of innovation and entry order, and
these different inclinations should be taken into account when studying pioneering
advantages.
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Kerin et al. (1992), for instance, stress the need to link organizational and environmental
variables to the research on pioneering advantages. Such link is needed because (Kerin,
et al., 1992: 48):
... environmental change presents opportunities to all firms, but a particular firm
must have certain competencies and capabilities, such as technological foresight,
perceptive market research, skillful product and process development capabilities,
marketing acumen, and possibly luck to be a successful market pioneer. Indeed,
depending on their unique strategic posture, some firms might benefit from early
entry and others might benefit from following.
Studying the interaction between entry and different business strategies could help
explain different patterns of performance for a given entry order and some of the mixed
results that are observed in the literature about pioneering (Szymanski, et al., 1995). The
relationship between pioneering and market share is consistent across studies2 but the
possibility of a follower outperforming an early entrant exists, and it could correspond to
the different strategies that firms follow. As Kerin et al. (1992:40) indicate,
Though environmental change provides an opportunity for a firm to be a first
mover, the likelihood of a firm benefiting from being a first mover depends on
several organizational factors, including the degree of fit between the (1) skills
and resources necessary to capitalize on an environmental opportunity and the
skills and resources possessed by the firm and (2) skills and resources necessary to
capitalize on mechanisms for enhancing a first-mover advantage and skills and
resources possessed by the firm to convert these mechanisms into a first-mover
advantage.
Few studies have explicitly studied competitive strategy and order of market
entry together. Lambkin (1988) considered strategy when investigating whether pioneers
enjoyed long term advantages from entering first into new markets. She classified
2See for example Szymanski et al. (1995) for a meta-analysis.
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entrants into pioneers, early followers, and late entrants, and her results confirm that
pioneers perform better than later entrants. For 2 subsamples of 129 start-up businesses
(using data for their first four years of operation) and 187 adolescent businesses (data for
their second four years of operation), Lambkin found that, generally speaking, pioneers
attain an important market share advantage over later entrants (on average 23.96% for
pioneers vs. 9.7% for late entrants in the start-up subsample and 32.56% vs. 12.95 in the
adolescent subsample). In Lambkin's study, however, strategy is equated to order of
market entry.3 As a result, the paper suggests the existence of different strategic
typologies moderating the relationship between order of market entry and market share,
but such moderating effects are not clearly explicated, particularly because it is assumed
that certain strategic typologies are inextricably linked to certain entry categories.
DeCastro and Chrisman (1995), contrary to Lambkin, treat this relationship as an
empirical question. These authors start with the premise that it is the combination of an
entry strategy and a competitive strategy that gives firms an enduring performance
advantage. Strategy is categorized as either low cost differentiation, utility and "stuck-in-
the-middle". These categorizations of strategy are an extension of Porter's (1980) low-
cost-differentiation dichotomy. In such vein, strategy is operationalized using 13 items
such as inventory/sales, receivables/sales, and the like. These authors found that both
order of market entry and competitive strategy have a significant effect upon
performance. For example, the ROI of pioneers with utility strategies (61.54%) was
significantly higher than the ROIs of pioneers with "stuck-in-the-middle" strategies
(19.85%). The study does suggest that the relationship between OME and performance
(in this case, financial performance measured by ROI) is influenced by the strategic
characteristics of firms. The definition of competitive strategy is, however, somewhat
3Pioneers are, ex-post, automatically termed "r-generalists", and late entrants become "k-specialists"
(following the terminology of population ecologists).
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unclear. Because strategy is defined ex post, based on observed values attained by firms
in a number of aspects, the sample ends up containing a disproportionately small number
of firms that follow a utility strategy. This notwithstanding, the study is valuable because
it clearly establishes that viewing order of market entry in the light of firm strategies can
render important insights, and particularly in regard to financial services.
Order of Market Entry and Strategy
We can see from the above that although much literature looks at order of market
entry by itself, strategy is inextricably linked to the outcomes of market entry. As Collis
and Montgomery (1995: 120) indicate,
Competitive advantage, whatever its source, ultimately can be attributed to the
ownership of a valuable resource that enables the company to perform activities
better or more cheaply than competitors...Superior performance will therefore be
based on developing a competitively distinct set of resources and deploying them
in a well-conceived strategy.
Yet, having resources and deploying them in attractive industries is insufficient if
adequate policies and consideration of the dynamics of entry are absent. Order of market
entry will inevitably require careful assessment, regardless of the uniqueness, abundance,
appropriability, or durability of the resources being deployed.
The effects of order of market entry can be analyzed from several perspectives. A
first approximation is to treat average order of market entry as a proxy for firm strategy
(Lambkin, 1988). Because firms posses unique resources and orientations (Collis and
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Montgomery, 1995), deployment of such resources might result in distinctive patterns of
entry (i. e., firms could be, characteristically, pioneers, early entrants, late entrants, or
laggards). Such first approximation has to be refined by incorporating other, very salient,
dimensions of strategy. First, expectations about entry are different at the corporate,
multi-business, and business level strategy. Definitions vary at these levels, and one must
be careful in identifying the aspects that characterize strategy in all cases. Second, a
definition of strategy may be more or less dynamic. Ex post definitions based on Porter's
low cost and differentiation categories or modifications thereof, result in
conceptualizations that are essentially static. This contrasts ex ante definitions of strategy
which seek to understand institutions' strategic behaviors as a series of actions taken
through time. These two dimensions, the level of analysis and the dynamism associated
to the firm's strategy, interplay differently, rendering categories in which the
relationship between order of market entry and market share must by analyzed
correspondingly. Such analysis within each of the four categories must be examined in
terms of the effects they have upon positioning (where applicable), focus, and the fit of
the products with the rest of the product line. Where strategy is viewed as firms seeking
to accommodate themselves in an industry with predetermined characteristics, market
share might be conditioned primarily by competitive positioning rather than order of
market entry. Here the effect of order of market entry would be dwarfed by the effect of
the competitive positioning at the business level. The study by De Castro et al. (1995)
might be conceptualized as falling within this category. At the corporate level issues of
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entry are important also, particularly across international markets (Mascarenas, 1992), but
the notions of focus and fit acquire different proportions. At the corporate level decisions
of focus and fit (or relatedness) are evaluated in terms of whole businesses. The decision
to participate in a market coupled to the extent to which businesses are going to be
interrelated determine the degree of focus (or diversification) of the corporation.
At the business level, scope will be determined in the amplitude of product
offerings and focus in the degree of interrelatedness of subsequent product offerings with
the rest. At this level, therefore, we can evaluate order of market entry and strategy
directly, by studying how one particular entry fits with the rest of the product portfolio.
Lopez and Roberts (1997) devised a methodology for calculating product interrelatedness
by categorizing products into client-product matrices and estimating a value for the
dispersion of the data points. Subsequent product offerings will be of three kinds: a)
entries that reduce the variability, b) entries that increase variability, or, plausibly, c)
entries that do not affect variability. These entries can be conceptualized as strategic
decisions related to business scope and focus, hence establishing a direct link between
order of market entry and strategy. By establishing characteristic orders of market entry
for certain players and, in particular, by establishing the relationship between order of
market entry with the strategic effect in terms of greater or less focus or fit, we can then
directly observe the effect of strategy on the relationship between order of market entry
and market share.
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In this study we seek to operationalize the strategy variable by characterizing
institutions into prototypical categories using extant measures. One widely used
classificatory scheme is Miles and Snow's strategic typology. This typology has
originated a large amount of research interest and support (Conant, et al., 1990; Zahra,
1987; MacDaniel and Kolari, 1987). Miles and Snow (1978) proposed that firms
develop patterns of behavior through a process that involves three multidimensional
collections of problems and solutions: an entrepreneurial problem set which focuses
upon an organization's product and market scopes; an engineering problem that is
centered around the choice of technologies and processes which will be used for
production and distribution; and an administrative problem that has to do with the
selection and development of processes and organizational structures. Miles, Snow et
al., (1978) proposed a theoretical framework that classified behavioral patterns used by
organizations to coalign with their environments. This framework defined three strategic
types of organizations: Defenders, Analyzers, and Prospectors. A fourth type, the
Reactors, is composed of firms that exhibit inconsistencies in their strategies,
technologies, structures, and processes. The characteristics of these typologies are
established along several dimensions associated with the entrepreneurial, administrative,
and engineering problems. One important dimension that differentiates these strategic
types is the rate of product innovation and the definition of product-market domains.
Prospectors actively engage in continuous expansion into new markets with new
products. Analyzers tend to carefully look for product-market opportunities and to
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embrace those which minimize risks and maximize profit opportunities. Defenders
remain narrowly focused trying to create a stable set of products and customers. Reactors
exhibit uneven and transient behavior with "...opportunistic thrusts and coping postures."
(Conant. et al., 1990). For instance, McDaniel and Kolari (1987) found that the
importance ascribed by executives to various marketing elements in a large sample of
financial institutions was significantly different among strategic types. They found that
the most significant differences were found among Defenders and either Prospectors or
Analyzers. These different manners of strategic coalignment appear to be stable over
time. Given the different ways in which the entrepreneurial problem is solved, one
should expect to see different results from pioneering for each of the typologies. Kerin et
al. (1992) argue that:
It is significant that the Miles and Snow strategy typology does not explicitly
advocate market pioneering as the normative strategic behavior conducive to
superior performance for all organizations, nor does it impute insurmountable
competitive advantages to the first mover. It suggests that though some
organizations might be inclined to enter a market first (prospector firms) because
of a distinct set of organizational competencies, others influenced by a different
set of distinct organizational competencies may be more inclined to enter a market
after its viability has been proven, and yet achieve performance levels comparable
or superior to those of the pioneer.
Despite the abundance of research about this typology, systematic classificatory
schemes are scarce. Zahra et al. (1990) review in detail several studies on the Miles-
Snow typology and conclude that most of this research doesn't take into account many of
the dimensions that comprise each of the typologies originally proposed by Miles and
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Snow (1978). Conant et al. (1990), in another study, reach similar conclusions, but they
offer a multi-item scale which does take all the underlying dimensions into account and
helps in the determination of pure strategic types. In this work we are using the scale
provided by Conant et al. (1990) with slight adaptations. Moreover, Shortell and Zajac
(1990) provided evidence that strongly support the validity of CEO assessment of the
firm's strategic orientations. These authors found that the use of knowledgeable key
informants within organizations was a valid approach for measuring strategy.
Another approach, and perhaps one of the most complete empirical analysis, is
that of Venkatraman. Venkatraman (1989) argues that,
... in spite of several discussions on alternate approaches to operationalizing
strategy (Ginsberg, 1984; Hambrick, 1980; Pitts and Hopkins 1982; Snow and
Hambrick 1980), the linkage between theoretical definitions and their
corresponding measures has been generally weak. Most existing measures for
the strategy constructs are either nominal (and/or single-item) scales that have
questionable measurement properties or multi-item scales whose measurement
properties (such as reliability, and unidimensionality, convergent and discriminant
validity as well as nomological validity) have not been systematically assessed
More recently, several authors (Miller and Friesen, 1978 and 1984; Dess and
Davis, 1984; and Venkatraman and Grant, 1986; and Venkatraman, 1989) have
developed alternate measurement systems to unveil differences in strategies. These
systems are comprised of several dimensions which together facilitate the development of
a fairly detailed portrayal of firms' strategic inclinations. Venkatraman (1989) proposes a
scale to measure strategic orientations of firms. The scale, denominated STROBE
(Strategic Orientation of Business Enterprises), consists of six dimensions:
Aggressiveness, Analysis, Defensiveness, Futurity, Proactiveness, and Riskiness.
Venkatraman's STROBE scale, although conceptualized at the business level, doesn't
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establish a clear link between its dimensions and decisions of scope and focus of the
business unit. Using our methodology, aggressiveness, for instance, could be
conceptualized as radical departures from the firms' average plot or, as another instance,
defensiveness could be viewed in terms of entries which are consistently reducing the
variability around the firms average client-product plot.
In this study, of course, we are not interested in advancing the development of
such schemes for measuring strategy. Rather, we are interested in studying in more detail
the effects of order of market entry when observed under the light of the entrant's
competitive strategy. Hence, to this end, we use already developed scales to measure the
construct. We must underscore that these measures of strategy do not provide clear means
for establishing the aforementioned effects through the client-product plots. Moreover,
such measures encompass only a portion of the total phenomenon. They portray dynamic
characteristics of business level strategy and, therefore, results cannot be extrapolated to
the corporate level.
Our purpose here is only to investigate whether certain strategic types will enjoy
advantages from pioneering, or, as Robinson et al. (1992: 622) indicate, whether
"...strategic windows for market entry tend to open at different times for different entry
types." There might exist firms with a built-in inclination for developing new products.
These would be firms that are on the constant lookout for new developments and are
interested in disrupting the market. Because of this, they might have developed skills for
coping with related risks and uncertainties associated with the development and
launching of new services. Other less aggressive firms may encounter themselves in a
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situation of being a pioneer or an early entrant, but, because of inexperience in dealing
with the situation, fail. Conversely, they may have become adept at exploiting proven
markets, hence they may achieve good performance despite entering relatively late.
Hypotheses
From the aforementioned we propose that:
HO: Firms that are characteristically early entrants will have a stronger effect of order of
market entry on long term market share. Prospectors will exhibit larger long term-
market shares than all other Miles and Snow strategic types. Firms which are
characteristically late entrants (such as defenders) will achieve performance outcomes
comparable to those of the pioneer.
HI: The relationship between order of market entry and market share will significantly
change when controlling for business strategic orientations. In particular, firms that score
high on the Aggressiveness dimension of Venkatraman's (1989) STROBE scale, will
enjoy greater long term market shares than other firms4.
Aggressiveness is understood, following Venkatraman ( 1989), as "...referring to
the posture adopted by a business in its allocation of resources for improving market
positions at a relatively faster rate than the competitors in its chosen market" Thus, we
would expect aggressive firms to improve market positions through the introduction of
4See Table 2 for a summary of the six strategy dimensions contemplated by Venkatraman to conform the
measuring scale.
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new products and through aggressive pricing. We should expect higher scores of this
dimension to be found among firms which are typically pioneers and early entrants.
Venkatraman's pilot findings indicate that firms which have aggressive postures did not
fare well when performance was measured using financial indicators. Yet, these firms
did have greater market shares despite weaker financial positions.
Methods
This study is based primarily on historical analysis. Product histories for several
financial products have been reconstructed and assembled using archival records
available in published sources of information (which include primarily newspapers, trade
journals, and research papers) and from other sources such as regulatory institutions. The
historic information was then validated with data from informants in pertinent institutions
and other people who were familiar with the industry. For convenience of data gathering,
the sample chosen is a set of three financial services launched in Costa Rica within the
past 15 years. As in the preceeding essay, we use a sample of 36 entries in three product
lines (credit cards, debit cards, and pension funds). Our choice of sample encompasses
products that were created recently. This permitted gathering a significant amount of
information from public records and cross-validating it with people in the industry who
had actually participated in the conceptualization and launching of the products.
In order to obtain information about strategic inclinations of firms, we used
primarily two sources of information. First we interviewed bank executives. These
interviews were semi-structured and were used to administer in-situ all scales used to
measure strategy. We also gathered information from three industry experts. Information
was then compared and contrasted. We requested clarification through the telephone.
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Care was taken to interview top level managers in the institutions under study. In some
cases we performed interviews with several members of the top management team in
each institution.
Model and Measures
The dependent variable of this study is total market share of the nth entrant at the
time of the study. Order of market entry is used as an independent variable. Pioneers are
operationalized as the first entrant. The institution's strategy is used as a control variable.
The model to be tested can be summarized as follows:
MSnc = Encal Snca2
Where:
MSnc = market share of the nth product to enter category c, in percent. It is termed
SHARE.
Enca = Order of entry of nth product in category c. It is termed ENTRY.
Snca 2 = Strategy of the firm that launched the nth product in category c. It is named
STRATEGY.
Two measuring schemes were used to characterize STRATEGY. Following our
discussion earlier, the first measure involves the use of Miles and Snow's (1978)
typology. In order to minimize the observations made by Zahra (1987) with respect to the
correct categorization of industry participants into such categories, a systematic scheme
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was used to assign categories. The measuring device closely follows the one proposed by
Conant et al. (1990).
The second measure utilizes Venkatraman's Strategic Orientation of Business
Enterprises or STROBE scale. This scale is comprised of six dimensions of strategic
orientation. These dimensions are: Aggressiveness, Analysis, Defensiveness, Futurity,
Proactiveness, and Riskiness. The meaning of each dimension is summarized in Table 2,
and the items used to measure them are indicated in Appendix 2.
Table 2: Description of dimensions that compose the Strategic Orientation of




* Improving market positions at a relatively faster rate than the
competitors, based on product innovations and/or market
Aggressiveness development or high investments to improve relative market share
and competitive position.
* Improvement of market positions in the short run (explosion).
* Pursuit of market share as an important path towards achieving
business unit profitability.
* Tendency to search deeper for the roots of problems and to generate
the best possible solution alternatives.
Analysis * Extent of internal consistency achieved in the overall resource
allocation for the achievement of chosen objectives
* Use of appropriate management systems.
* Does not reflect the 'Analyzer' behavior of Miles and Snow.
* Emphasis on cost reduction and efficiency seeking methods.
Defensiveness * Reflects view of organizations seeking to defend their core
technology and the preservation of own products, markets and
technologies.
* Reflects temporal considerations.
* Relative emphasis of effectiveness (longer-term) considerations
Futurity versus efficiency (shorter-term) considerations.
* Manifested through emphasis in areas such as forecasting sales and
customer preferences and formal tracking of environmental trends.
* Reflects proactive behavior to participate in emerging industries.
Proactiveness * Continuous search for market opportunities and experimentation
* Introduction of new products.
* Patterns of decision making and resource allocation in the choice of
Riskiness products and markets.
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Data Analysis and Results
In this section we first compare and contrast the two alternative ways that were
utilized to measure the independent variable STRATEGY. Then, after an exploratory
data analysis, we fit regression models in which SHARE is regressed against ENTRY and
STRATEGY.
Measurement of the independent variable STRATEGY
Before conducting any data analysis, all items in Venkatraman's Strategic
Orientation of Business Enterprises Scale (STROBE) were tested for reliability in terms
of the Cronbach ca coefficient. This index is commonly used for measuring the reliability
of indicators. For pre-testing purposes, we administered our questionnaire to a group of
MBA students with experience in the financial services sector and thereupon to a group
of managers of financial institutions from several countries. We finally tested the
instrument with a group of 23 financial institutions. These pre-tests indicated that some
reversed items appeared to confuse respondents. By changing these items we were able to
attain reliability indicators which ranged between 0.49 to 0.84, as shown in Table 3. The
reliability of the Riskiness indicator is very close to the cutoff point of 0.5 proposed by
Nunnally (1967) for preliminary research. After the first pretest we tried to improve the
reliability of this indicator by adding more items and primarily through improving the
quality of the items. In the subsequent pre-test, an important improvement was observed.
This item is also one of the two that exhibits the lowest internal consistency reliability
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indices (0.53) in Venkatraman's (1989) original work. We decided to utilize this
indicator, noting, nonetheless, its potential drawbacks.
Table 3. Reliability Analysis of indicators of STROBE scale used
to measure strategy.







Scatterplots of these indicators for our final pre-test show a fairly strong positive
relationship between Analysis, Defensiveness, and Proactiveness. No evident
curvilinearities appear to be present. Descriptive statistics for each of the items, shown in
Table 4, reveal that the smallest means occur for Aggressiveness and Riskiness.
Likewise, though certainly at least one institution scored the maximum score (7) in the
variables Analysis, Defensiveness and Futurity; the maximum score observed in the
variable Riskiness is 5.3. This might be due, according to the opinion of an industry
expert, to the peculiar meaning that the word risk entails in banking. Risk in this industry
is a multidimensional concept that must be actively managed, and bankers tend to be risk
averse. Thus, in the banking industry managers deal with several types of risk, for
example: credit risk (risk that loans will not be repaid), interest rate risk (risk that
earnings will decline if interest rates change), liquidity risk (risk that funds will be tied up
and cash will not be available when needed); insolvency risk (risk of liabilities becoming
greater than assets), and currency risks. As a result the variable Riskiness in this industry
has more connotations and implications than simply a reflection of businesses' resource
allocations.
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics of the indicators in the
STROBE scale.
Variable Mean Std. Min. Max.
Dev.
Aggressiveness 3.6 1.3 2.0 6.3
Analysis 4.9 1.4 2.2 7.0
Defensiveness 4.5 1.4 2.7 7.0
Futurity 5.1 1.3 2.0 7.0
Proactiveness 4.0 1.5 1.8 6.3
Riskiness 3.8 1.1 1.0 5.3
The emerging relationships we observed in the scatterplots were confirmed
through Spearman-rank correlation coefficients (Table 5) which showed a strong and
positive relationship between Analysis and Defensiveness, Futurity and Proactiveness (in
all cases S-r >= 0.59, p<0.001). This suggests that, from a strategic standpoint,
Analytical proclivity is not associated solely with passive strategic postures but also with
more proactive stances even for firms operating in the same environment. Similarly,
Proactiveness is positively correlated with Defensiveness (S-r= 0.74, p<0.001) which
suggests that one company may adopt a proactive stance towards defending its existing
markets or that a firm may be proactive while defending certain market niches. No
significant relationships are observed between the variables Aggressiveness and
Riskiness, either between them or with other variables. This would suggest that an
aggressive strategic posture is rather divorced from a more analytical long-term
orientation.
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Table 5. Spearman-rank correlation coefficients for all indicators of the
Strategic Orientation of Business Enterprises Scale.
Aggressiv. Analy. Defensiv. Futur. Proactiv.
Aggressiv. 1.00
Analysis 0.08 1.00
Defensivenes 0.25 0.77*** 1.00
s
Futurity 0.05 0.70*** 0.72*** 1.00
Proactiveness -0.07 0.72*** 0.74*** 0.59** 1.00
Riskiness -0.14 0.03 -0.01 -0.15 0.07
***p<0.001, **p<0.01
The results shown in Table 5 are similar to those obtained by Venkatraman (1989:
955) in his pilot study where the variable Analysis is positively and significantly
correlated
with Defensiveness, Futurity and Proactiveness. Defensiveness is also positively and
significantly correlated with Futurity and Proactiveness, and Futurity is correlated
(positively and significantly) with Proactiveness. The only observed difference with
Venkatraman's results is in the relationship between Aggressiveness and Riskiness. He
found a positive correlation while here we observe no correlation. Such difference could
arise from definitional problems we have already observed when exploring the data. In
all, though, observed results do not depart significantly from the expected outcomes,
particularly those mentioned in Venkatraman (1989) which were the only benchmark
available. We were fairly comfortable that the STROBE scale was adequately portraying
strategy for this sample of firms.
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We then proceeded to classify the 23 firms into typologies, utilizing Conant et al.'s
(1990) strategic types scale. According to this scale, 10 entries in our sample were made
by institutions that were categorized as Prospectors, 9 were done by Analyzers, 8 by
Defenders, and 7 by Reactors.
Although the measurements of STRATEGY that we were using were essentially
different, we decided to check whether both scales were categorizing and classifying the
institutions object of the study in ways which were somewhat consistent. To do so, we
first cross tabulated the results as shown in Figure 1. The figure shows that Prospectors
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Figure 1. Cross tabulation of Miles and Snow Strategic Types with Venkatraman's
Strategic Orientation of Business Enterprises Scale.
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Table 6 shows Wilcoxon Rank-Sum for differences in medians for each of the six
strategy dimensions and the typology of Miles and Snow. Prospectors, as a class, are
clearly significantly different from Defenders in 5 of the six categories but only
significantly different from Analyzers in 3 of the six categories. Analyzers fall, as
expected from the theory (Miles, et al., 1978), somewhere between Prospectors and
Defenders. Entries in this typology are significantly different from Defenders and
Prospectors in 3 of the six categories. Reactors appear to have an uneven behavior across
categories.
Table 6. Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test for difference in medians. Difference in medians
found significant by strategic type and for each of the six strategy dimensions of the
STROBE scale.
Strategy dimension
Aggressiveness Analysis Defensiveness Futurity Proactiveness Riskiness
1-3* 1-2* 1-3~ 1-2 1-2~
1-4- 1-3* 3-4 -a 1-3~ 1-3-a





I=Prospectors, 2=Analyzers, 3=Defenders, 4=Reactors.
Regression Analyses.
Once we had evaluated the scales used to measure our independent variable
STRATEGY, we concentrated on fitting the proposed regression models to evaluate entry
effects in conjunction with firm strategy. Our first step in the analysis was to devise
scatterplots of SHARE against ENTRY and the items of STRATEGY. Inspection of the
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scatterplot of SHARE against ENTRY denoted the existence of curvilinearity. We
therefore decided to transform the independent variable SHARE taking its natural
logarithm. The transformed variable was thereupon termed SHARE*. Bi-variate
scatterplots showed that such transformation apparently restored linearity to this
relationship. A table of Spearman-rank correlation coefficients (Table 7) indicated the
existence of a strong and negative correlation between SHARE* and ENTRY.
Table 7. Spearman-rank correlation coefficients for performance, entry, and
strategy variables.
ENTRY SHARE* Aggre- Analysis Defen- Futurity Proa- Riskines




Aggressiveness 0.28- -0.13 1.00
Analysis 0.06 -0.09 0.16 1.00
Defensiveness -0.08 0.14 0.12 0.73*** 1.00
Futurity -0.03 0.14 0.05 0.77*** 0.78*** 1.00
Proactiveness -0. I1 0.04 -0.06 0.78*** 0.79*** 0.61*** 1.00
Riskiness 0.06 -0.17 -0.30~ -0.14 -0.11 -0.17 -0.00 1.00
***p<0.001, - p<O.1
We observed a similar relationship among the items of the STROBE scale for
institutions that had product entries to the one we observed when pre-testing with a larger
sample of financial institutions. There are strong and positive bivariate correlations
among Analysis, Defensiveness, Futurity, and Proactiveness. There is a weak positive
relationship between ENTRY and Aggressiveness. This could indicate that aggressive
firms do not necessarily tend to enter the market first with innovative products. Perhaps
such firms are likely to enter the market later with an emphasis on price undercutting or
heavy investments in promotion.
Following these analyses, we established one control predictor (ENTRY) and one
question predictor (STRATEGY), represented in this case by the several items that
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comprise the STROBE scale. The relatively large correlations among the variables that
comprise the STROBE scale, particularly the high correlations observed among Analysis,
Defensiveness, Futurity, and Proactiveness, could eventually result in problems with
multicollinearity. We, hence, built a sequence of nested models carefully observing the
possible occurrence of multicollinearity. Three regression models were subsequently
fitted and analyzed. In the first model we simultaneously introduced the variables
Analysis, Defensiveness, Futurity and Proactiveness as question predictors, together with
the question predictor ENTRY. The rationale behind such choice of predictors is that the
observed correlation of the analytical orientation of the businesses with the other key
strategic dimensions suggests that firms scoring high on these items have developed a
somewhat consistent manner and evaluation of strategic options. Here we follow
Venkatraman (1989) who indicates that "...perhaps, those businesses with strong
analytical orientations are neither too risky nor too aggressive in pursuing market share in
general." Thus, here we would be facing institutions that tend to have a longer-term
inclination toward the allocation of resources for operating the business. New product
development is probably associated with such resource allocation tendencies.
The second model tested has Aggressiveness solely as a question predictor. The
observed positive relationship between Aggressiveness and ENTRY would seem to
suggest that aggressive behavior is not necessarily related to entering the market first.
This is a bit counterintuitive, but, nevertheless, plausible, if firms that aggressively seek
market share do so through means other than the disruption of markets by introducing
entirely new products.
We finally fitted a model in which Riskiness was used singly as a question
predictor and ENTRY is used as a control. Risky behavior should be associated with
exploration of new markets where returns are not certain.
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The results of these analyses are summarized in Table 8.
Table 8. A taxonomy of fitted regression models for the relationship between
order of market entry, strategy and market share for a set of financial service
innovations.
Model Intrcpt. ENTRY Aggr. Anal. Defens. Futurity. Proact. Risk. R2
(%)
1 -2.23*** -0.24*** 0.13 62
2 -3.27*** -0.22*** -0.42 0.013 0.65* 0.002 69
3 -1.42- -0.23*** -0.10 62
Base -1.79*** -0.24*** 62
***p<0.OO 1, *p<0.05, -p<0. 1
Table 8 shows that, contrary to what we expected, the variables Aggressiveness
and Riskiness have little effect upon the fit. The addition of these variables (singly or
jointly) do not render an appreciable change in the R2 statistic of the baseline model in
which SHARE* is simply regressed against ENTRY. The addition of the variables
Analysis, Defensiveness, Futurity, and Proactiveness, do appear to have an important
impact on the fit. We observe that Futurity has a beta coefficient of 0.65 (p<0.05). Such
occurrence warrants further exploration.
We introduced the aforementioned four variables (Analysis, Defensiveness,
Futurity, and Proactiveness) into the model in various combinations. We found that only
the Futurity variable showed an important effect upon the model. As can be seen in Table
9, introduction of this variable into the baseline model results in a difference in R-sq. of
0.0434. This difference is important (Fobserved = 4.486 >Fcritical=3.316).
We also tested the effects of interactions. None was appreciable. An inspection
of the scatterplot of studentized residuals for this model did not show heteroscedasticity
and permitted validating the assumptions about independence of errors. The assumption
about normality of the residuals was validated through inspection of the normal
probability plot. No evidence of multicollinearity was found when the model was tested
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through the tolerance statistic (Tol=l which renders a Variance Inflation factor slightly
greater than one which precludes collinearity even for small data sets).
Table 9. Comparison of reduced baseline model with model in which the
variable Futurity has been added.
Model Intercept ENTRY FUTURITY R2 AR2 dfE
Reduced -1.792*** -0.236*** 0.62 34
Full -3.42*** -0.235*** 0.314* 0.659 0.0434 31
***p<O.001, *p<0.0 5
Before interpreting the model, we performed sensitivity analyses to examine the
potential impact of atypical data points upon the regression model. Influence statistics,
Cook's D and Hat H, were then calculated to perform such assessment. Figure 3 shows a
scatterplot of Hat vs. Cook's D statistics. No single point seems to stand out
conspicuously from the rest. Nevertheless, regression analyses were performed to
evaluate the impact of points labeled 4, 15, and 16 in Figure 3. The Beta coefficients of
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After performing these analyses our best and chosen model was one that regressed
SHARE* against ENTRY and Futurity. The assumption about normality of the residuals
was validated through inspection of the normal probability plot of the residuals.
Inspection of plots of raw and studentized residuals served to validate the assumptions
about independence of errors.
Thereupon, we fitted an additional regression model using the categorical measure
of the variable STRATEGY. These categories were used as dummies, in which 1
indicated whether the entrant belonged to that particular category. We first did an
exploratory data analysis. Given the categorical nature of our variable STRATEGY, the
mean of such variables is interpreted only as the percentage of entries that are considered
to be done by firms which belong to this strategic typology (in Table 10: Prospectors
29%, Reactors 21%, etc.). These numbers do not permit making any inference about
relative frequency of entry by strategic type.
Table 10. Descriptive statistics for strategic typologies
present in the sample.
Variables Mean s.d. Min. Max.
ENTRY 8.30 5.92 1 21
SHARE* -3.75 1.78 -7.46 -0.39
Prospectors 0.29 0.46 0 1
Analyzers 0.26 0.45 0 1
Defenders 0.24 0.43 0 1
Reactors 0.21 0.41 0 1
Further related inquiry was performed by inspecting Spearman-rank correlation
coefficients of all variables. Given that we use ranks to evaluate emerging correlations, a
positive correlation between ENTRY and some strategic type should signal the tendency
of such type to be composed primarily of late followers (and vice versa, a negative
correlation should signal the tendency of the particular strategic type to be constituted
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principally by pioneers or early entrants). Such appears to be the case. Table 11 shows
a negative correlation (S-r= 0.33, p < 0.1) between Prospectors and ENTRY. This
indicates that entries done by Prospectors tended to occur early. In contrast, the positive
correlation between ENTRY and Defenders indicates that entries done by Defenders
tended to happen late (relatively speaking). As a result, we observe a fairly strong and
significant correlation between Prospectors and SHARE (S-r = 0.38, p<0.05). We can
infer from this table that Prospectors tend to enter early and, possibly as a result, tend to
reap higher market shares. This indicates that SHARE varies for different strategic types
for a given order of market entry. These observations are of course not conclusive given
the dichotomous characteristics of the variables at issue, but they do warrant further
exploration.
Table 11: Spearman-rank correlation coefficients for ENTRY,









***p<0.001. **p<0.01, *p<0.05, p<0.1
Following these analyses, and as suggested by the observation of the Spearman-
rank correlation coefficients, we decided to use the strategic typologies as question
predictors, using ENTRY as a control, and proceeded to fit a taxonomy of regression
models. To do so, we built a model in which the question predictors were introduced
simultaneously to the baseline model of SHARE* vs. ENTRY. Table 12 summarizes the
results of this analysis.
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Table 12.: Taxonomy of regression models in which ENTRY is used as a control
and Miles and Snow typologies are used as question predictors. The question
predictors are introduced into the model simultaneously. The fourth typology
becomes automatically defined when all other question predictors are zero.
Model Intrcpt. ENTRY Prospectors Analyzers Defenders R2 AR2 df Error
(%) (%)
Baseline - i.79*** -0.236*** 61.59
M1 - .76*** -0.219*** 0.32 -0.81 -0.26 66.54 4.95 29
***p<0.001. **p<0.01, *p<0.05. - p<O.1
We have included only three of the four strategic dimensions. Given that they are
dichotomous (O or 1) the fourth dimension will become automatically specified when all
others are set to zero. Assumptions about normality of the residuals were validated
through inspection of the normal probability plot. Plots of raw and studentized residuals
and serial correlations of residuals did not show evidence of infringement of the
assumption about the independence of errors (see Figure 4). We chose this model as our
basis for discussion and interpretation. Notice, however, how remarkably strong is the
relationship between order of market entry and SHARE. Despite the introduction of
additional variables, the difference in the R2 statistic is relatively small.
Fig 4: Normal probability plot, and plot of residuals for model in which strategic
typologies are introduced as question predictors in a model that regresses ENTRY
against SHARE.
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Summary and Discussion
We wanted to assess the effect of order of market entry upon market share,
controlling for some "strategic effects." The goal was to determine whether innovation
initiatives in the development of new financial services may result in better performance
if launched during certain time frames by firms which follow particular strategies. We
found that a baseline model in which SHARE* was regressed against order of market
entry (ENTRY) explained over 60% of the variability in performance. Including
variables that measured firm strategy only had a minor effect on our baseline model. The
relationship between ENTRY and SHARE remained remarkably consistent, and in line
with most other work that has been done in this area. The effects of strategic interactions
are dwarfed by the magnitude of the main effect (ENTRY).
When we classified entrants into Miles and Snow's strategic typologies, we found
that early entry had larger effects upon Prospectors. Figure 6 shows that, for a given
entry, Prospectors gain, on average, higher market shares than all other strategic types.
This is in line with what we had hypothesized. The relatively small size of our sample
made it very difficult to assess performance by entry type and entry decision. The graph,
then, shows only the average result (that Prospectors tend to outperform other entry types
for a given time of entry). The results, however, permit making some inferences as to
when certain followers may turn out to outperform the pioneer. Such observations must
be taken with caution. We can see that, for instance, other things being equal, a Defender
that pioneers a new product will be outperformed by a fourth entrant which is a
Prospector. Such occurrences could explain why in certain studies it has been found that
followers are able to capture larger market shares than pioneers. Further research could
assess whether these observed differences, and in general, whether observed differences
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in strategic types correspond to fundamental differences in available resources and
capabilities.
Our results apply only to business level strategy, and we are not assessing the
effect that each entry has upon the product portfolio of the company. It is suggestive,
however, that our limited data indicated that certain strategic types have less focused
product portfolios. Prospectors appear to have larger product arrays aimed at different
markets. Although, given the limitations of our data, we cannot rigorously test these
differences, it could be interesting if further research could look into the parallelism
existing in the characteristics of product portfolios and strategic types. By assessing the
effect of subsequent entries on the dispersion of the matrix, one could more easily
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These results are in rough consonance with our qualitative data. When we asked
bank executives to determine how pioneering products had been developed and to rate
their success, we observed that pioneering products were developed differently. Some
(about 24% of the cases listed) were generated in an orderly and formalized manner with
a somewhat structured process of market research and a subsequent development process
aimed at satisfying certain market needs. Most products (43.5%) were adaptations of
ideas that had been seen operating in other countries. A third large category of products
(13%) stemmed from regulatory changes.5 Products that were developed or produced in
response to some perceived market need seemed to be the most successful, as shown in
Table 13. The performance measures here are clearly inadequate (executives' self
ratings), but the results suggest that longer-term considerations do have an important
impact upon performance, and, particularly, that formal processes of research and
development may result in improved returns for a given entry decision in financial
services innovations. These structural modes of product generation seem to conform to
different strategic Miles and Snow types. Establishing such correspondence for financial
services could be an interesting research path.
5These products, according to executives, could be anticipated and developed in a somewhat automatic
mode.
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Table 13. Sources of ideas for pioneering products developed within firms.
Generation of the idea N % Perf.
I. Perceived market need. Formal process of research,
development and launching of product to satisfy the need. 23.9% 2.73
2. Realized product was successful in other countries and
decided to launch a similar product.
20 43.5% 2.25
3. Spontaneous. The idea "happened" and all of the sudden
we were working on the product.
8 17.4% 2.38
4. Regulatory changes allowed launching the product locally. 6 13.04% 2.0
5. It was just a small adaptation to something that already 1 2.2% 2.0
existed in the market.
Our analysis showed that only one of the strategic dimension in the Venkatraman
STROBE scale had a significant impact upon the baseline model. This was
counterintuitive and opposed to our hypothesized relationship. We had presumed that
Aggressive firms, and aggressiveness as a strategic trait, would magnify returns from
pioneering efforts. This was not the case. A regression model in which the variable
Aggressiveness was added to a baseline model (of SHARE* against ENTRY) did not
show any significant increment in the R2 statistic. Figure 5 is a visual display of SHARE
against Futurity for different entry times. The results indicate a positive relationship
between SHARE and Futurity. However, this relationship is significant only at the 0.05
level and, given the limitations of our data, we cannot make any normative conclusion
based on this isolated outcome. Perhaps the apparently intended comprehensiveness of
Venkatraman's (1989) scale and the lack of orthogonality among the different items that
comprise them tend to overwhelm and conceal the effect of more routinary strategic
decisions. Not having enough discriminant power it becomes almost impossible to assess
the characteristics of the firms that exhibit stronger entry effects.
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This study has many limitations. One with which we were particularly concerned
was the need to stratify the sample. Perhaps such stratification (into say early entrants,
early followers, late entrants, and laggards) could then indicate different strategic types to
be better than others for each subsample (hence for different timing of entry decisions).
Another limitation of this study is the presumption that strategies are persistent
over time. Though it is apparent that strategic traits tend to remain stable over time
(Miles, Snow, et al., 1978), perhaps to the point of inducing rigidity (Leonard-Barton,
1992; Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995), it is perfectly plausible that strategies change
over time particularly because of possible and important changes in institution personnel.
Our data do not permit us to assess this fully. We measured strategy at one point in time
and presumed that the same strategy had been maintained when products were launched.
To explore this, we gathered data on top management tenure within each institution. We
were able to collect data for 11 institutions in the sample which reported that the CEO
had an average of 14.7 years of experience within the same institution (St. dev. = 5.6
years). We had no means to validate this information and we also had relatively young
institutions that had entries in our sample.
In all, the study showed that it might be fruitful to consider organizational and
environmental factors when analyzing the effects of order of market entry. Such
considerations might reveal strategic traits that are better adapted to different timing of
entry decisions. Though our results are only suggestive, further research could address
the limitations of this pilot study in order to evaluate whether in fact entry decisions can
be actively managed to maximize performance for a given set of skills and resources.
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Indicators for Venkatraman's (1989) STROBE scale. Adapted from Venkatraman (1989).
1. Aggressiveness Dimension. Seven-point scales for the following: 1) In our organization we
sacrifice profitability to gain market share; 2) In our organization we often cut prices to increase
market share; 3) In our organization we tend to set prices below competition; 4) In our
organization we seek market share position at the expense of cash flow and profitability.
II. Analysis Dimension. Seven-point scales for the following: 1) We emphasize effective
coordination among different functional areas; 2) Our information systems provide support for
decision making; 3) When confronted with a major decision, we usually try to develop thorough
analyses; 4) We normally use different planning techniques; 5) We use the outputs of
management information and control systems to make decisions; 6) Our organization does
manpower planning and performance appraisal of senior managers.
III. Defensiveness Dimension. Seven-point scales for the following: 1) We often introduce
significant modifications to our technological platform; 2) We use cost control systems for
monitoring performance; 3) We use different techniques to improve productivity of systems and
people.
IV. Futuritvy dimension. Seven-point scales for the following: 1) Our criteria for resource
allocation generally reflect short-term considerations (rev)6; 2) We emphasize basic research to
provide us with future competitive edge; 3) In this organization we are constantly forecasting
key indicators of operations; 4) In this organization we formally track significant general trends;
5) When confronted with critical issues we perform scenario analyses.
V. Proactiveness Dimension. Seven-point scales for the following: 1) We are constantly
seeking new opportunities related to the present operations; 2) We are usually the first ones to
introduce new brands or products in the market; 3) We are constantly on the look out for
businesses that can be acquired; 4) Competitors usually precede us in the introduction of new
products or practices (rev); 5) We eliminate operations which are in the later stages of their life
cycle.
VI. Riskiness Dimension. Seven-point scales for the following: 1) Our operations can be
generally characterized as high-risk; 2) We seem to adopt a rather conservative view when
making major decisions (rev); 3) New projects are approved on a "stage-by-stage" basis rather
than with "blanket" approval (rev); 4) We have the tendency to support projects where expected
returns are certain (rev); 5) Our organization generally follows a "tried and true" paths (rev).
Strategic Types scale. Adapted from Conant, Mokwa, and Varadarajan (1990).
1. Entrepreneurial: product/market domain. In comparison to other banks, the services which
we provide are best characterized as: a) Services which are more innovative, continually
changing and broader in nature throughout the organization and marketplace (P); b) Services
which are fairly stable in certain units/departments and markets while innovative in other
units/departments and markets (A); C) Services which are well focused, relatively stable and
consistently defined throughout the organization and marketplace (D); d) Services which are in a
state of transition, and largely based on responding to opportunities or threats from the




2. Entrepreneurial: success posture. In contrast to other banks, my organization has an image in
the marketplace as a bank which: a) Offers fewer, selective services which are high in quality
(D); B) Adopts new ideas and innovations, but only after careful analysis (A), c) Reacts to
opportunities or threats in the marketplace to maintain or enhance our position (R); d) Has a
reputation for being innovative and creative (P).
3. Entrepreneurial: surveillance. The amount of time my bank spends on monitoring changes
and trends in the marketplace can best be described as: a) Lengthy: We are continuously
monitoring the marketplace (P); b) Minimal: We really don't spend much time monitoring the
marketplace (D); c) Average: We spend a reasonable amount of time monitoring the
marketplace (A); d) Sporadic: We sometimes spend a great deal of time and at other times
spend little time monitoring the marketplace (R).
4. Entrepreneurial: growth. In comparison to other banks, the increase or losses in demand
which we have experienced are due most probably to: a) Our practice of concentrating on more
fully developing those markets which we currently serve (D); b) Our practice of responding to
the pressures of the marketplace by taking few risks (R); c) Our practice of aggressively
entering into new markets with new types of service offerings and programs (P); d) Our practice
of aggressively penetrating more deeply into markets we currently serve, while adopting new
services only after a very careful review of their potential (A).
5. Engineering: technological goal. One of the most important goals in this bank, in comparison
to other banks, is our dedication and commitment to a) Keep costs under control (D); b) Analyze
our costs and revenues carefully, to keep costs under control and to selectively generate new
services or enter new markets (A); c) Insure that the people, resources and equipment required
to develop new services and new markets are available and accessible (P); d) Make sure that we
guard against critical threats by taking whatever action is necessary (R).
6. Engineering: technological breadth. In contrast to other banks, the competencies (skills)
which our managerial employees possess can best be characterized as: a) Analytical: their skills
enable them to both identify trends and then develop new service offerings or markets (A); b)
Specialized: their skills are concentrated into one, or a few, specific areas (D); c) Broad and
entrepreneurial: their skills are diverse, flexible, and enable change to be created (P); d) Fluid:
their skills are related to the near-term demands of the market place (R).
7. Engineering: technological buffers. The one thing that protects my organization from other
banks is that we: a) Are able to carefully analyze emerging trends and adopt only those which
have proven potential (A); b) Are able to do a limited number of things exceptionally well (D);
c) Are able to respond to trends even though they may possess only moderate potential as they
arise (R); d) Are able to consistently develop new services and new markets (P)
8. Administrative: dominant coalition. More so than many other banks, our management staff
tends to concentrate on: a) Maintaining a secure financial position through cost and quality
control measures (D); b) Analyzing opportunities in the market place and selecting only those
opportunities with proven potential, while protecting a secure financial position (A); c)
Activities or business functions which most need attention given the opportunities or problems
we currently confront (R); d) Developing new services and expanding into new markets or
market segments (P).
9. Administrative: planning. In contrast to many other banks, my organization prepares for the
future by: a) Identifying the best possible solutions to those problems or challenges which
require immediate attention (R); b) identifying trends and opportunities in the marketplace
which can result in the creation of service offerings or programs which are new to the banking
industry or which reach new markets (P); c) Identifying those problems which, if solved, will
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maintain and then improve our current service offerings and market position (D); d) Identifying
those trends in the industry which other banks have proven possess long-term potential while
also solving problems related to our current service offerings and our current customers' needs
(A).
10. Administrative: structure. In comparison to other banks, the structure of my organization is:
a) Functional in nature (i.e. organized by departments like marketing, accounting, personnel, etc.)
(D); b) Service or market oriented (i.e. departments like corporate or retail banking have
marketing or accounting responsibilities (P); c) Primarily functional (departmental) in nature;
however, a service or market oriented structure does exist in newer or larger service offering
areas (A); d) continually changing to enable us to meet opportunities and solve problems as they
arise (R).
11. Administrative: control. Unlike many other banks, the procedures my organization uses to
evaluate our performance are best described as: a) Decentralized and participatory encouraging
many organizational members to be involved (P); b) Heavily oriented toward those reporting
requirements which demand immediate attention (R), c) Highly centralized and primarily the
responsibility of senior management (D); d) Centralized in more established service areas and
more participatory in newer service areas (A).
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